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1 Introduction
Most modern governments implement a redistributive fiscal policy, where incomes are
taxed at an increasingly higher rate, while the provision of public services and transfers is
skewed towards the poor. Such policies are thought to deliver a more equitable distribu-
tion of income and welfare, and, thereby, provide social insurance for future generations,
who face uncertainty about what conditions they will be born into.
In market economies, such egalitarian policies can be costly as they disrupt the effi-
ciency of resource allocation. Therefore, the added benefit of a publicly provided social
safety net, that is over and above what is available to people through other sources, such
as their family or the private sector, has to be carefully weighed against this cost. In this
paper, we provide such an analysis of the optimal degree of income redistribution for a
government that aims to maximize average welfare.
The possibility of a bad start is perhaps the most important economic risk in life.
Studies show that 60-90% of the cross-sectional wage dispersion is explained by perma-
nent differences among workers when they start their careers (Keane and Wolpin, 1997;
Haider, 2001; Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron, 2004), suggesting that pre-market factors,
be they innate or acquired, are extremely important for subsequent economic success.
Private provision of insurance against such risk naturally fails in this context. Since in-
surance, by definition, excludes pre-existing conditions, private provision would only be
possible if a third party, such as parents, were able to sign their kids into obligations on
their future earnings before they were born, or of legal age. Furthermore, unlike transi-
tory shocks, permanent differences are the hardest to insure by individual means when
markets are incomplete. These limitations may generate a case for publicly provided in-
surance through a redistributive tax system.
The optimal design of a redistributive tax system is, however, subject to constraints.
We emphasize three. First, although a market for private insurance does not exist in our
context, agents may have access to insurance through other means. Parental transfers,
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in particular, provide a natural source of insurance against adverse economic outcomes.
In order to prepare for risks faced by their offspring, parents accumulate precautionary
funds. A redistributive tax policy would alleviate the need for parental insurance and
crowd out accumulation of capital, leading to reduced investment.
Second, informational frictions may prevent the government from observing individ-
ual productivity. Consequently, it levies taxes on total income only, which leads to well-
known incentive problems as higher taxes discourage workers from labor and thereby
reduce output.
Third, the policymaker has to be cognizant of the implications of its tax policy on
prices. Large-scale shifts in labor supply and savings alter the wage rate and the interest
rate, which may have redistributive repercussions for income.
We address these constraints explicitly in a dynastic general equilibrium model with
incomplete markets and endogenous labor supply, where generations are linked through
a correlated income process. Families are not allowed to sign contracts contingent on
their offspring’s income. They can save, nonetheless, and transfer wealth to subsequent
generations. They may not, however, pass their debt onto them. This is essentially an
Aiyagari-Bewley-Hugget setting at dynastic frequency à la Barro (1974).
In this setting, we search for the optimal redistributive income tax scheme. Our ap-
proach to the problem is primarily quantitative and is in the tradition of Ramsey (1927).1
The planner may not modify the financial structure of the economy. It cannot, for in-
stance, introduce new assets or allow parents to accept obligations for their kids. It may,
however, implement a transfer scheme, for example to transfer income to poor agents.
Transfers and government expenditures are financed by taxes levied on labor and capital
income. The set of tax policies is restricted to parametric forms albeit flexible ones. The
tax schedule used here not only provides a good fit to the current U.S. system, but also
1A parallel set of papers study the implications of information frictions in dynamic economics for allo-
cations that are efficient under incentive-compatibility constraints (Mirrlees, 1971; Golosov, Kocherlakota,
and Tsyvinski, 2003; Kocherlakota, 2005; Albanesi and Sleet, 2006; Farhi and Werning, 2012). The problem
studied here is also one of constrained optimality, although the constraints are different.
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allows for a variety of tax systems, such as progressive, flat, regressive and lump-sum.2
We assume that the government can commit to a once-and-for-all change in the tax policy,
and ask two questions: Which tax policy maximizes average welfare at the steady state of
our model economy? Which tax policy maximizes average welfare along a transition path,
starting from the current wealth and income distributions in the U.S.?
We find that the optimal tax policy for the long-run steady state is moderately regres-
sive. When the government spends 25% of total output, the bottom fifth of the income
distribution is taxed, on average, by 42%, and the top fifth pays 15% of their income, with
a median tax rate of 29%. By contrast the current tax code in the U.S. calls for a tax rate
of 16% tax for the lowest fifth, and 30% for the top fifth of the income distribution, with a
median tax rate of 23%.
The intuition for this result is simple. A less progressive tax system fosters creation of
wealth and income by raising the after-tax return to labor and savings, resulting in higher
average consumption. The improvement in consumption levels is weighed against larger
wealth and income inequality brought about by regressive taxation, an undesirable fea-
ture for a utilitarian government. The latter, however, is mitigated for two reasons. First,
the larger supply of capital lowers the interest rate, while boosting the wage rate as la-
bor complements capital in production. Consequently, the equilibrium price adjustment
redistributes income away from the wealthy, who rely primarily on capital income, to
consumption-poor agents who rely heavily on labor income, and counterbalances the
increase in inequality generated by regressive taxation. Second, the availability of self-
insurance through parental savings considerably limits the impact of income inequality
on consumption inequality. These mechanisms are effective until moderate levels of re-
gressivity, after which the marginal value of leisure outweighs that of additional income,
which prevents further increases in hours worked. Output and average consumption
stop rising, while inequality keeps growing, leaving no incentive for the government to
2Note that lump-sum taxes are not trivially optimal in our framework since the competitive equilibrium
in Aiyagari (1994) is not constrained-efficient (Davila et al., forthcoming).
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reduce progressivity any further.
When the short run dynamics are considered, a sudden switch to a regressive tax
system from the current U.S. system is neither desirable nor politically feasible. Accumu-
lation of the additional capital requires limited consumption of goods and leisure along
the transition path, which limits the welfare gains from changing the tax policy. Fur-
thermore, a sudden change in the tax system involves large and immediate transfers of
income which generates substantial income inequality in the short-run. Due to discount-
ing, these concerns outweigh the long-run benefits of regressive income taxation. A util-
itarian government therefore prefers a tax system that is slightly more progressive than
the current status quo in the U.S. once transition dynamics are taken into account.
The literature on optimal taxation is vast. The approach here is closest to Conesa
and Krueger (2006) and Conesa, Kitao, and Krueger (2009), who calculate the optimal
progressivity of income taxes for an OLG economy with incomplete markets and hetero-
geneous agents. Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2010) take a similar approach to
compute optimal progressivity in a Blanchard-Yaari-Bewley economy with partial insur-
ance, and without capital. We differ crucially from these papers by allowing dynasties
to self-insure via capital accumulation and bequests, and by introducing a correlation of
income risk across generations. The results show that both components are important
in gauging the value added by publicly provided social insurance, and for modeling the
appropriate consumption response to tax policy. In particular, when insurance from non-
public sources is available, a benevolent planner may prefer to improve social welfare by
affecting incentives in the private insurance market and by harnessing general equilib-
rium effects rather than by directly providing insurance via income redistribution. As a
result, the optimal tax schedule computed here is less progressive.
Erosa and Koreshkova (2007), Seshadri and Yuki (2004) and Benabou (2002) also look
at taxation problems in dynastic settings, with emphasis on human capital investment
and education. Benabou (2002) abstracts from dynastic capital accumulation and Se-
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shadri and Yuki (2004) from labor supply. Both Erosa and Koreshkova (2007) and Se-
shadri and Yuki (2004) analyze consequences of a flat tax reform, but do not calculate
optimal non-linear taxation. Conesa and Krueger (1999) and Nishiyama and Smetters
(2007) focus on payroll taxes and social security. Cutler and Gruber (1996), Rios-Rull and
Attanasio (2000), Golosov and Tsyvinski (2007) and Krueger and Perri (2011) study how
publicly provided insurance schemes can crowd-out insurance that is available through
other sources. Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1995), in particular, emphasize the crowd-
ing out of precautionary savings by public tax policy.
2 A Dynastic Model with Redistributive Income Taxation
The model is a standard model of savings with uninsured idiosyncratic income risk (Aiya-
gari, 1994; Bewley, 1986; Hugget, 1993) applied at a dynastic frequency and extended to
allow for non-linear fiscal policy and endogenous labor supply.
The economy consists of a continuum of heterogeneous consumers, a representative
firm, and a government. We interpret each model period as a generation. There is a
continuum of agents in a generation, each endowed with dynastic capital, k, and labor
skill, z. With these endowments, they can generate an income of y = zwh+ rk, where w
is the market wage per skill unit, h ∈ (0, 1) is hours worked and r is the interest rate net
of depreciation.
Agents pay taxes on their income to finance an exogenous stream of government ex-
penditure, which we assume proportional to aggregate output: gt = γY. The disposable
income of an agent net of taxes is given by yd(y), which depends only on the agent’s total
income. This function also determines the distribution of the tax burden.
Agents can allocate their resources between consumption and investment in dynastic
capital, which can be used to transfer wealth to their offspring, but not to borrow from
them. They derive utility from consumption, and they dislike work. They care about their
welfare as well as their offspring’s, which depends on the amount of wealth passed on by
6
their parent as well as their own skill endowment. The latter is determined stochastically
by a first-order Markov process: F(z′|z).
The problem of an agent is to choose labor hours, consumption and capital investment
to maximize utility. The wage rate, the interest rate and the aggregate distribution of
agents over wealth and productivity, denoted by Γ, are given. Let Γ′ = H(Γ) describe the
evolution of the distribution over time. The Bellman equation for a consumer’s problem
is:
V(k, z; Γ) = max
c,k′≥0, h∈(0,1)
{
c1−σ
1− σ − θ
h1+e
1+ e
+ βE[V(k′, z′; Γ′)|z]
}
(1)
subject to
c+ k′ = yd(y) + k
Γ′ = H(Γ).
The production technology of a representative firm uses aggregate capital, K, and la-
bor, N, as inputs, and takes the Cobb-Douglas form: F(K, N) = KαN1−α. Factor markets
are competitive, and firms are profit maximizers.
A competitive equilibrium of the model economy consists of a value function, V(k, z; Γ),
factor supplies, k′(k, z; Γ) and h(k, z; Γ), a wage rate, w(Γ), an interest rate r(Γ), and an
evolution function H(Γ) such that:
(i) Given w(Γ), r(Γ) and H(Γ), V(k, z; Γ) solves the worker’s problem defined by (1)
with the associated factor supplies k′(k, z; Γ) and h(k, z; Γ).
(ii) Factor demands are given by the following inverse equations:
r(Γ) = α(K/N)α−1 − δ
w(Γ) = (1− α)(K/N)1−α
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(iii) Markets clear:
K =
∫
k′(k, z)dΓ(k, z) and N =
∫
zh(k, z)dΓ(k, z).
(iv) H(Γ) is consistent with F(z′|z) and the savings policy k′(k, z; Γ).
(v) The government budget is balanced:
g =
∫
[y− yd(y)]dΓ(k, z).
A steady-state of the economy is a competitive equilibrium where the distribution of
agents is stationary, i.e. Γss = H(Γss).
2.1 A Redistributive Income Tax Policy
Taxes are modeled after the current U.S. income tax system, which can be approximated
by a log-linear form for disposable income:
yd = λ(zwh+ rk)1−τ. (2)
The power parameter τ ≤ 1 controls the degree of progressivity of the tax system,
while λ adjusts to meet the government’s budget requirement. When τ = 0, the equation
above reduces to the familiar proportional tax (or flat tax) system. When τ = 1, all income
is pooled, and redistributed equally among agents. For more moderate values, when
0 < τ < 1, the tax system is progressive.3
The disposable income function above also allows for negative taxes. Income transfers
are, however, non-monotonic in income. When taxes are progressive, transfers are first
increasing, and then decreasing in income. Examples of such transfers schemes include,
3The average tax rate is 1− λy−τ , which is increasing in y if τ > 0.
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earned income tax credit, welfare-to-work programs etc. In Section 3, we show that this
functional form provides a remarkable fit to the U.S. tax system.
A regressive tax system is achieved when τ is negative. In this case taxes are first
increasing, then decreasing in income for high enough income levels, and may prescribe
positive transfers for high income earners. Since the marginal tax rate, 1− λ(1− τ)y−τ, is
monotonic in pre-tax income, (2) rules out tax policies that are progressive for some parts
of the income distribution and regressive elsewhere.
In addition to the tax policies spanned by (2), a lump-sum tax system is considered
as a benchmark. Note that a lump-sum system is not necessarily optimal since compet-
itive equilibrium of the Aiyagari (1994) model is not constrained efficient (Davila et al.,
forthcoming).
2.2 Planner’s Problem
The government is run by a benevolent planner who seeks to maximize average welfare in
the economy. The planner chooses the progressivity of the tax policy subject to a balanced
budget constraint and equilibrium responses by households to the tax policy. We consider
two experiments. In the first one, the planner is concerned with the average welfare at
the long-run steady-state of the economy. Formally, the problem is:
max
λ,τ
W ss =
∫
Vss(k, z; Γss)dΓss(k, z)
subject to
g =
∫
[y− yd(y;λ, τ)]dΓ(k, z)
y = wzh(k, z; Γss) + rk′(k, z; Γss).
where Vss is the value function, Γss is the stationary distribution of agents over produc-
tivity and wealth, h(.) and k′(.) are the policy functions at the steady-state equilibrium
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associated with the tax policy (λ, τ). The dependence of these functions on the tax policy
is suppressed for notational convenience.
In addition to the steady-state equilibrium, the planner may be concerned with the
short-term consequences of a tax reform during the transition to the new steady state.
Suppose that the government can credibly commit to a once-and-for-all change in the tax
policy. In the second policy experiment, the planner seeks to maximize average utility
by choosing the parameters of a tax reform. Specifically, the planner solves the following
recursive problem:
W(Γ) = max
λ,τ
∫
U(c(k, z; Γ), h(k, z; Γ))dΓ(k, z) + βW(Γ′)
subject to
g =
∫
[y− yd(y;λ, τ)]dΓ(k, z)
y = wzh(k, z; Γ) + rk′(k, z; Γ)
Γ′ = H(Γ),
where H(Γ) satisfies the consistency condition of the competitive equilibrium and the
starting distribution Γ0 is given.
3 Empirical Analysis and Calibration
The model is calibrated to the U.S. economy with emphasis on intergenerational income
risk.4 The model period is 25 years. The discount parameter β is calibrated to generate
an annual interest rate of 4.3%. The capital share of income, α, is set to 0.36, and the
depreciation rate to 8% per annum. The rate of relative risk aversion is set to 2.0.
This leaves three sets of parameters: the fiscal policy, (γ,λ, τ), the preference parame-
4The findings are qualitatively similar when life-cycle income fluctuations are considered. Results from
a calibration that incorporates life-cycle income risk to the model are presented in the appendix.
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ters for labor, θ and e, and the stochastic intergenerational income process, F(z′|z). These
parameters are identified as follows.
3.1 How Progressive is the U.S. Tax System?
The progressivity of the current tax system is estimated using household-level data from
March supplements to the Current Population Survey for 1979 to 2009. Federal and state
income taxes, as well as the payroll tax per household are obtained from the NBER tax
simulator (Feenberg and Coutts, 1993). Our measure of pre-tax income is gross earnings,
as reported by the household, plus the payroll tax. Disposable income is defined as re-
ported earnings less federal and state income taxes. The estimated log-linear regression
is:
log yd(y) = 1.34+ 0.83 log y+ XΓˆ R2 = 0.94,
where X includes indicators for survey year. The correlation coefficient indicates that the
log-linear specification fits the U.S. tax system remarkably well. Figure 1 further confirms
this visually by plotting average disposable income by quantiles of pre-tax income (cir-
cles) over the regression line (solid). Two points are worth noting. First, the slope of the
regression line is less than one, showing the progressivity of the U.S. tax system. The
implied value of τ is 0.17 (0.0026).5 This also seems to be a good approximation of the
progressivity of the tax system defined over life-time income, as modeled here.6 Second,
the bottom five percent of the gross-income distribution are paying negative or zero taxes.
[Figure 1 about here.]
5Corporate taxes are not available in our dataset. To test the relevance of this for our estimate, we
estimated the same specification for 2004 based on the information in Table 2 of Piketty and Saez (2007),
who impute corporate taxes in their calculations using federal tax returns. We estimate the progressivity to
be 0.164, virtually the same as our estimate above.
6To compare the cross-sectional estimate of τ to one that would apply to life-time income, we simulated
earnings processes based on data from the PSID, and re-estimated τ. The resulting estimate was close to
the one used here with the difference being less than 0.01.
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We estimate the size of the government expenditures as 25% of output based on total
income taxes (state and federal) and payroll taxes relative to GDP. Given τ = 0.17 and
γ = 0.25, the value of λ is determined at the equilibrium by the government’s budget
constraint.
3.2 Intergenerational Wage Mobility
The stochastic intergenerational income process is estimated directly using data on mul-
tiple generations from the PSID (1968 - 2009). First, a fixed effects regression is estimated
for hourly wages for respondents of ages 24 to 60, controlling for indicators for age and
survey year. Then fathers are paired with sons to estimate the intergenerational wage
transition matrix.7
[Table 1 about here.]
The results are shown in Table 1. The transition matrix displays a significant degree
of persistence. The implied average intergenerational correlation of wages is 0.35 (0.004),
which is close to the values reported in the literature. The last row shows the average
wage rate in each quartile of the life-time wage distribution in 1999 dollars.8
3.3 Leisure and Labor Supply
The preference parameter for labor disutility, θ, is calibrated to average hours worked
over life for a generation. The curvature of the utility with respect to hours worked, e,
governs two crucial moments in the model economy: the intergenerational elasticity of la-
bor substitution, and the cross sectional dispersion of hours worked within a generation.
Since little is known about the former, we calibrate this parameter to the coefficient of
variation of average lifetime labor hours. In the next section, we test our calibration using
7For fathers with multiple sons, we replicate the wage observations for the father.
8All income values were adjusted by CPI.
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the model’s implications for the intergenerational correlation of hours, and by calculating
a pseudo-elasticity across generations.
To calculate the cross-sectional distribution of life-time hours within a cohort, we cal-
culate a similar fixed effects regression, controlling for age and survey year. To capture
variations in labor force participation (e.g. due to retirement, schooling or cyclical varia-
tions), all observations on workers of ages 15 to 75 are included in the regression. Those
years where the respondent reported working zero hours are also included. An average
person in the sample works 1,908 hours a year, which makes up 44% of their available
time.9 The coefficient of variation is 0.29.
3.4 Calibration Results
Table 2 summarizes the calibrated values for the parameters. The implied values for the
utility parameters are: θ = 0.305, e = 0.825, and β = 0.965. Next, we evaluate the
calibration results by comparing the predictions of the model for labor supply elasticities,
intergenerational correlations of household wealth and hours.
[Table 2 about here.]
Labor Supply Elasticity
The elasticity of labor supply is a crucial parameter of interest for gauging the distor-
tionary effects of taxation on hours. In the model, the labor supply elasticity depends
on the tax policy and the prices in the economy. These are kept fixed at their calibrated
values to compare the model’s predictions for individual labor supply schedules with the
estimates found in the literature.
Since the model is dynastic, any change in the wage rate is, by construction, perma-
nent over the lifetime of the generation. The relevant measure of elasticity to gauge the
changes in the labor supply is the Marshallian elasticity. In the benchmark calibration,
9The total available time is calculated as 4,368 hours (= 12 hours × 7 days × 52 weeks).
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the (Marshallian) wage elasticity varies from 0.07 to 0.58, with an average of 0.42, and
a standard deviation of 0.10. As expected, it is decreasing in wealth, and increasing in
productivity. The uncompensated (pre-tax) income elasticity is -0.72 on average with a
standard deviation of 0.10. It is decreasing in wealth, and non-monotonic in productivity.
These values are well within the range of estimates reported in Blundell and MaCurdy
(1999).
The utility function features a constant Frisch elasticity of (1 − τl)/(e + τl), which
equals 0.84 given the benchmark calibration. It is hard to compare this to the estimates in
the literature since the intertemporal substitution of labor in a dynastic context is not
a well-defined concept. Nonetheless, the micro level estimates for yearly models are
around 0.25 for individuals, while a value between 2 and 3 is required to match employ-
ment differences across time and countries at the macro level (See Prescott (2004); Cho
and Cooley (1994) and Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) among others.)
Intergenerational Correlations
The model is calibrated to the intergenerational mobility of wages. Given the optimal
policies for labor supply and savings, the model has implications for the persistence of
hours and wealth from one generation to the next. Table 3 reports the transition matrix
for wealth computed in the model, and compares it with the one estimated by Charles
and Hurst (2003) using data from the PSID. While the model captures the main features of
wealth transitions, it predicts somewhat higher persistence, especially for the top quintile.
The strength of persistence is more pronounced in the transition of hours. The elasticity
of offspring’s working hours with respect to parent’s working hours is 0.85 in the model,
whereas it is around 0.20 in the data.
[Table 3 about here.]
The model is expected to produce more persistent wealth and hours distributions,
because the agents in the model differ only with respect to their productivity. Their pref-
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erences towards consumption and labor are identical, whereas the data may contain other
dimensions of heterogeneity. Disutility of labor, for instance, may vary from one member
of a dynasty to the next. Second, the wealth transitions in Charles and Hurst (2003) are
based on wealth before the parent generation is deceased, i.e. it excludes the final be-
quest, and should be considered as a lower bound on persistence of wealth. Finally, the
data may contain measurement error, which leads to a seemingly more mobile transition
matrix.
4 How Progressive Should the Long-Run Tax Policy Be?
To determine the optimal tax policy, we run two tax policy experiments. In the first exper-
iment, the steady-state equilibrium is computed for different tax policies with varying de-
grees of progressivity. In the second experiment, we compute the expected welfare along
a transition path to a steady-state equilibrium, in response to a once-and-for-all change
in the progressivity of the tax code. In this section, we focus on the first experiment, and
discuss the optimal long-run tax policy and its projected impact on the economy. Then we
conduct counterfactual experiments to isolate the role of different modeling assumptions
on our results.
The findings suggest that the optimal tax code in the long-run is moderately regres-
sive. The optimal value for τ is -0.38. The tax rates implied by this value are shown in
Table 4. The optimal long-run tax policy calls for an average tax rate of 42% for the lowest
decile of the income distribution compared to 15% for the top decile. The median tax rate
is 29%. By contrast, the benchmark economy, calibrated to the U.S. tax policy, has an av-
erage tax rate of 16% for the bottom decile relative to 30% for the top decile. The median
tax rate in the benchmark economy is 23%.
[Table 4 about here.]
Although average tax rates are monotonically declining in income at the optimal steady-
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state, taxes are not. Tax payments are increasing in income for the first two thirds of the
income distribution, and begins to decline for the top tertile. The share of taxes paid by
the lowest income decile is 6% compared to 9% for the top decile.
How could a regressive tax system, which subjects low income groups to higher tax
rates, be optimal for an egalitarian government? To see this, note that a utilitarian poli-
cymaker is concerned with two things when comparing tax policies: the total amount of
available goods (consumption and leisure), and how these goods are distributed among
agents. A less progressive tax policy raises the average level of consumption at the cost of
higher after-tax income inequality. This does not translate to equally severe consumption
inequality since agents self-insure via dynastic capital accumulation. As a consequence,
the optimal tax schedule may well be regressive if the increase in inequality is sufficiently
small compared to the increase in average consumption.
Table 5 summarizes the impact of progressivity on the steady-state of the model econ-
omy. The first column reports the values for the benchmark economy calibrated to the
U.S. tax policy (τ = 0.17). Columns further right display less progressive tax systems,
and the last column shows the optimal tax code.
[Table 5 about here.]
A decline in the progressivity of the tax policy promotes generation of income by in-
creasing the after-tax return to labor and capital. This raises savings in the economy. Less
progressive income redistribution also raises the risk faced by future (unborn) genera-
tions, and gives parents an incentive to accumulate additional precautionary savings. For
high-income groups, there is an additional income effect generated by lower taxes, which
further encourages accumulation of capital. For low-income groups, the income effect
works against the substitution effects, but is not strong enough. Overall, supply of capital
increases, which puts a downward pressure on the interest rates.
The larger capital stock has two implications for labor. First, it raises the demand for
labor, and increases the wage rate, despite the downward pressure created by the increase
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in the labor supply. Second, larger wealth has a negative income effect on labor supply,
limiting the increase in labor input, and pushing the wage rate further up. With a larger
stock of capital and increased labor input, output increases. The optimal tax system leads
to a 44% increase in output, which translates to a 34% increase in consumption. The
rise in welfare due to higher average consumption is slightly mitigated by the decrease
in average leisure from 0.56 to 0.48. A more important mitigating factor is the rise in
inequality, which we turn to next.
4.1 Tax Progressivity and Inequality
Overall, an average person in an economy with less progressive taxes has larger wealth,
higher income, substantially more consumption, and slightly less leisure. To compare
this improvement in the utility of an average person with the potential changes in dis-
tributive inequality, Table 6 shows the Gini coefficients for crucial variables in the model.
The economy with regressive taxes features larger wealth inequality along with a con-
siderable increase in the inequality of after-tax income disposable for consumption. The
Gini coefficient for wealth inequality increases from 0.51 to 0.59, and from 0.16 to 0.25 for
disposable income. The latter is roughly equal to the increase in income inequality in the
U.S. during the second half of 20th century.
[Table 6 about here.]
The impact of rising income and wealth inequality on consumption, however, is lim-
ited. The Gini coefficient for consumption inequality rises from 0.13 to 0.18, about half
the rise in disposable income inequality. This is due, in large part, to the availability of
self-insurance through dynastic capital. This result is also consistent with Krueger and
Perri (2006), who find that the rise in consumption inequality has been muted relative to
income inequality after 1980.
The Gini coefficient for leisure inequality increases from 0.16 to 0.20. This is even less
than the increase in the inequality of goods consumption. Overall, the rise in welfare
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inequality remains small relative to the gains in average consumption.
The change in equilibrium prices also helps alleviate the effects of declining progres-
sivity on pre-tax income inequality. The decline in the interest rate mitigates the effect of
rising wealth inequality on income inequality, while the higher wage rate increases the
weight on labor income, which is more equally distributed under regressive taxes. These
help explain the relatively stable pre-tax income inequality in Table 6.
4.2 Tax Progressivity and Steady-State Welfare
The improvement in average steady-state welfare when the economy switches to the op-
timal tax code can be measured in consumption units for comparison. To calculate a
consumption equivalence, we ask the following hypothetical question: by what factor
would one need to increase the consumption of each and every person in the benchmark
economy to reach the same average welfare as the optimal economy, keeping their labor
supply constant? The answer is 9.1%. Such an improvement in welfare is quite large
considering that the welfare cost of business cycles are estimated at 1% or less.10 This
calculation ignores the changes in welfare during the transition to the new steady-state,
which is studied in Section 5.
[Figure 2 about here.]
To see how the distribution of welfare across agents changes, we first compare the
value functions for a given wealth and productivity level, without taking into account
the shift in the wealth distribution. Figure 2 plots welfare by wealth for the lowest and
the highest productivity groups (out of 4 in total). The solid lines correspond to the bench-
mark economy, and the dashed lines represent the economy operating under the optimal
tax code. The optimal economy features lower welfare for the wealthy, especially for
10For a risk aversion of two (as here), Krebs (2007) reports 0.98%, which is much larger than the estimate
reported in Lucas (1987).
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those with little labor income. This is primarily due to the lower interest rate in the op-
timal economy. Workers with low wealth, on the other hand, are dependent on labor in-
come, which is higher in the new economy due to higher wage rates. This leads to higher
welfare for the highly productive, who have higher disposable incomes in the new tax
system, and mitigates the fall in welfare for workers with low productivity and, hence,
income, who receive less transfers.
A utilitarian policymaker also considers the shift in the wealth and income distribu-
tions when comparing these two economies. In particular, the optimal economy features
a higher wealth level on average, which leads to an upward movement along the dashed
welfare functions in Figure 2.
4.3 Labor Supply, Self-Insurance and Partial Equilibrium: Implications for Tax Policy
We emphasized three crucial constraints on the policymaker’s choice of redistributive tax
policy: the crowding out of labor supply, availability of self-insurance via parental wealth
and adjustment of prices in equilibrium. To highlight the relative roles of these constraints
for the optimality of progressive redistribution, three counterfactual calculations are pre-
sented in this section.
We conduct two experiments to gauge the implications of dynastic wealth for opti-
mal taxes. First, we recompute the optimal tax code assuming that savings behavior is
fixed at the benchmark economy. This prevents agents from optimally adjusting their
precautionary savings policy to the tax system. It therefore shuts down the response of
private insurance to public insurance. Prices and labor supply are allowed to respond
optimally, and the budget is balanced at all times. Shutting down the savings response
to tax policies prevents accumulation of new capital in response to less progressive taxes.
Consequently, less progressive tax policies lead to consumption inequality without any
improvement in aggregate output and consumption. As a result, the optimal tax policy
in this case is moderately progressive with τ of 0.27.
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The experiment above shuts down the savings response, but is not comparable to
models without capital. To emphasize the role of capital, we simulate a second counter-
factual economy, where capital is held entirely by the government, and supplied com-
petitively to firms. The government keeps the total stock of capital constant at the U.S.
benchmark level. The return on capital is deducted from total tax obligations of workers.
Workers have no wealth, hence, there are no savings decisions to be made. They choose
their labor supply every period. Essentially, this is a static model. The optimal tax policy
in this hypothetical economy features considerable progressivity with a τ of 0.46. This
result is not too surprising. Relative to the previous scenario, workers are now stripped
of their ability to retain any wealth to insure themselves against income fluctuations. Any
shock to income is a shock to consumption, raising the need for insurance through a tax
system. This results in a more progressive optimal tax code. The only factor that prevents
full redistribution from being optimal in this economy is the endogenous labor supply.
These two experiments show that the interaction between public and private insur-
ance is key for the results above. When the private insurance (or precautionary savings)
response to changes in the tax system is shut down, regressive taxes don’t induce capital
accumulation and are not optimal anymore.
The optimal tax system also implies strong price effects. To gauge their importance,
we compute optimal taxes for a partial equilibrium economy, where the wage rate and
the interest rate remain at their benchmark levels. Savings and labor supply still respond
optimally, and the government runs a balanced budget. With fixed prices, the changes
in savings and labor supply in response to a decline in progressivity do not translate
into higher wages and lower interest rates. This shuts down the redistributive role of
equilibrium price adjustment, making regressive taxes less attractive. The optimal taxes
are moderately progressive in this case with a τ of 0.23.
If, in addition, the labor supply response is shut down in the partial equilibrium econ-
omy, the optimal progressivity increases from 0.23 to 0.31. Since redistribution is not
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allowed to crowd out labor supply, optimal policy becomes more progressive. At the
same time, the increase in progressivity is modest, partly because lifetime labor supply is
not very elastic.
These experiments reveal that two features are key for the optimality of a tax sys-
tem: the effect of taxes on private insurance and capital accumulation, and the resulting
changes in prices in general equilibrium. Therefore, the presence of capital in the analysis
is crucial.
The findings here could also be viewed in the light of the findings in Davila et al.
(forthcoming), who show that in Aiyagari (1994) type models, agents’ individual savings
decision in the laissez-faire equilibrium imply that the economy does not reach its con-
strained efficient optimum. When the income of the poor consists mainly of labor income,
as here, the utilitarian planner prefers to subsidize savings to promote capital accumula-
tion, which raises the wage rate and, hence, income for the low consumption groups.
The planner in Davila et al. (forthcoming) implements this policy by state-dependent tax
and transfer schemes on capital income. When state-specific policies are not feasible, a
regressive income tax system can stand-in for more complicated mechanisms.
Also note that the results are not driven by joint taxation of capital and labor. In a ver-
sion of the model with a linear tax on capital income and a non-linear tax on labor income
of the form shown in equation (2), the optimal progressivity of labor income taxation is
-0.26 when the tax rate on capital is 25%, and -0.23 when capital is not taxed at all.
5 Optimal Redistribution along a Transition Path
The optimal tax code described in the previous section encourages capital accumulation
and accordingly leads to substantially higher wages than the benchmark economy. Get-
ting there is costly, however: Increased capital accumulation requires initially reducing
consumption and/or leisure. Therefore, the transition to the steady state following a
switch to a regressive tax system is costly and matters for welfare. Comparing steady
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states abstracts from this cost. Depending on its size, implementing the tax code that
is optimal in the long run may not be optimal once the transition is taken into account.
Overall welfare including the transition may instead be maximized by a different tax
code. Therefore, we next ask the following two questions: What is the welfare effect of
implementing the tax code that is optimal at the steady state of the economy? And which
level of progressivity of the tax code is optimal, taking into account the transition from
the current U.S. benchmark?
5.1 Transition to the Optimal Steady State
In analyzing this issue, we assume that the economy initially is in the benchmark steady
state that reproduces the U.S. status quo. In this situation, the government surprisingly
implements the new tax code and commits to it. As the economy converges to the new
steady state induced by the changed tax system, the interest rate, the wage rate and λ
all change. Recall that government expenditure is a constant fraction of output, and the
parameter λ of the tax code adjusts to balance the government’s budget every period. The
algorithm used to compute the transition path is described in the appendix.
[Figure 3 about here.]
Results show that the transition to the optimal long run policy is very costly. Values of
key endogenous variables along the transition path are shown in Figure 3. The economy
moves into the neighborhood of the new steady state in about 4 periods. Over this time,
the capital stock is more than doubled and consumption is increased by a third. Early
in the transition, however, increased capital accumulation implies much lower leisure.
Furthermore, a sudden change in the tax policy brings about a substantial increase in the
after-tax income inequality, and, thereby, consumption inequality, for the first generation.
Unlike the rise in average consumption, which is realized in the future, the increase in
consumption inequality is immediate. Since each period lasts 25 years, these early periods
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have very high weight. (Subsequent generations carry much lower weight, e.g. the weight
of the fifth generation is only about 1%.) Therefore, while the only generation that actually
loses in terms of V is the first one, its loss is so large and its weight so heavy that the
transition becomes undesirable. As a consequence, the cost of the transition wipes out
the welfare gains achieved in the steady state with the regressive tax policy, and it is not
optimal to implement that policy.
Could a regressive tax reform raise enough political support? This depends on the
share of winners from such a policy. Suppose that there were a referendum at the bench-
mark steady state on the optimally regressive tax policy. Only those who are economically
active during that period can vote in the referendum. The value functions along the tran-
sition path indicate that only 30% of the population would vote in favor of a regressive tax
policy. This support consists of mostly (currently) high income earners and the wealthy.
The percent of support by productivity (in an increasing order) is 1%, 3%, 13% and 82%.
A similar picture emerges across wealth groups. Less than 1% of those with low wealth
(lowest third) support the policy, compared to 30% of agents in the middle wealth group
and 57% of the wealthiest third.
Implementing the transition to the optimal steady state is not optimal because losses
suffered by early generations outweigh the benefits received by later generations. This
raises the question whether support for the reform could be garnered if side payments
from winners to losers were permitted.11 For the transition to the optimal steady state,
consumption of period-1 winners could be reduced by 3.3% of status quo output without
dropping their welfare below the status quo level. However, raising the welfare of period-
1 losers to the status quo level would require increasing their consumption by 12.4% of
status quo output. Side payments therefore are not sufficient to make this reform accept-
able. This is similar for other large reforms. The most regressive reform that could be
acceptable with side payments is a transition to τ of 0.05, which would require payouts
11A similar scheme is applied by Nishiyama and Smetters (2007) in their analysis of social security priva-
tization.
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of just below 1.3% of status quo output to compensate losers, while winners would still
be better off after facing a consumption reduction of 1.3% of status quo output.
5.2 Optimal Tax Reform along the Transition
This raises the question which tax reform is optimal, starting in the U.S. status quo. We
find that the optimal reform of progressivity consists in slightly increasing progressivity,
from 0.17 to 0.26.
Comparing steady states, higher progressivity results in a 17% decrease in the capital
stock, with most of the decrease taking place in the first three periods. It also implies
slightly higher leisure, resulting in a 3% decline in the aggregate labor input. These two
changes induce a fall of about 7% in aggregate consumption. Applying the same criterion
as in Section 4.2, agents in the status quo would require about 4% larger consumption in
every state to be willing to live instead in the steady state implied by the more progressive
policy.
[Figure 4 about here.]
Why then is this an optimal reform? The answer lies in the transition. Apart from the
difference in direction, the transition path, which is shown in Figure 4, is qualitatively
similar to the transition to the optimal steady state. A progressive tax reform leads to an
immediate redistribution of income, leading to lower inequality of income and consump-
tion for the current generation, a desirable outcome for a utilitarian planner. Increased
progressivity also discourages labor supply, leading to higher average leisure for the cur-
rent generation. Due to discounting, the combination of these two desirable features out-
weighs the loss of average consumption by future generations.
Overall, 48% of the agents are better off under a progressive tax reform. Those with
higher productivity or higher wealth fare worse. The level of political support is decreas-
ing in wealth (81%, 51% and 13% by tertiles of wealth) and in productivity (95%, 80%,
46% and 0% for four productivity states).
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6 Discussion
The results highlight the different roles of public policy as an insurance device. When
alternative sources of insurance are available, the planner may find it optimal to harness
the effect of taxes on demand for private insurance and, thereby, on the equilibrium prices
to improve social welfare. A regressive tax system achieves this by raising the wage rate
and lowering the interest rate, giving the policymaker the option of eliminating the dis-
tortionary effects of a progressive system while keeping inequality under control. When
the long-run outcomes of public policy are considered, this alternative is preferable to di-
rect provision of social insurance via progressive taxation. The latter proves more costly
as it also crowds out labor supply and savings.
By contrast, direct redistribution through a progressive tax reform is preferable when
short-run dynamics are considered. Immediate reduction of inequality outweighs a re-
duction in long-run welfare. This is due to two reasons. First, arriving at a steady-state
with a higher capital stock requires longer labor hours along the way. Second, since capi-
tal is inelastically supplied in the short-run, the policymaker may find it optimal to raise
the tax rate for high income groups, who rely more heavily on capital income. This is
akin to the result in Chamley (1986), where the government finds it optimal to initially
confiscate the entire private capital stock before lowering the tax rate on capital to zero.
If the tax policy were announced ahead of time, the planner would not be able to
redistribute the existing resources as effectively. The capital supply would decline in
response to the announcement before the policy takes effect. As a result, the planner
would prefer a tax reform that is less progressive. Moreover, when announced sufficiently
early, future redistribution of resources is less costly for the current generation since the
future state of a dynasty does not depend strongly on its current state (unless shocks are
fully persistent). This helps increase the political support for a tax reform.
Weighting of generations is also crucial for the optimality along the transition. If, for
instance, the planner assigned (almost) equal weights to all generations, the welfare at the
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steady-state would outweigh the short-run considerations. An alternative is to design in-
tergenerational tax and transfer schemes to bring part of the increase in long-run average
welfare to the current generation to compensate for longer hours. An implementation
of such transfers may be possible if the planner can issue current debt against payments
by future generations. How the possibility of debt affects the optimal progressivity of
income tax policy remains as a promising venue for future research.
Appendix
A Life-Cycle Income Risk and Optimal Progressivity
The focus has so far been on the roles of intergenerational income risk and dynastic wealth
accumulation for optimal taxation, whereas income fluctuations over the life-cycle were
assumed away. This choice was motivated by the fact that life-cycle income risk consti-
tutes a much smaller fraction of total income inequality. In this section, we check the
sensitivity of the findings to this assumption.
To do this, we set the time period to 5 years and introduce a probability of death µ
of 0.20 per period.12 If an agent dies, his successor draws a new productivity level given
the transition matrix in Table 1, and takes over the dynastic capital. If the agent survives,
which happens with probability 1− µ, he draws a new productivity level from a different
transition matrix that governs income fluctuations over a worker’s life.13 We assume
perfect altruism. The rest of the model remains the same.
We estimate the life-cycle income risk using the PSID by calculating the transition
probabilities for 5-year intervals. The first panel in Table 7 shows the estimated probabil-
ities. The levels of productivity are defined by the distribution of average lifetime wages
as in the previous section. Compared to the intergenerational transitions, there is much
12The period length is 25 years in the benchmark model and 5 years in the lifecycle model, which gives a
relative duration of 5 periods. A death probability of 20% yields an average life of 5 periods.
13A somewhat similar approach was employed in Castaneda, Diaz-Gimenez, and Rios-Rull (2003).
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more persistence over life. Conditional on being born in the first quartile, the chances
that a worker moves up the quartile ladder in the next 5 years is 25%. Conditional on sur-
vival, it is 56% after 25 years, our period length in the benchmark specification. Across
generations, this probability is 66%.
[Table 7 about here.]
To see the impact of adding life-cycle income risk, the second panel in Table 7 shows
the combined transition matrix over 25 years assuming that the probability of death is
0.20. Overall, introducing the life-cycle income process reduces the persistence of income
shocks, especially for higher income categories.
We recalibrate the model to the same targets as in Table 2, which changes two of our
parameters: the disutility of labor, θ, which is now 0.34, and the parameter of labor supply
elasticity, e, which becomes 0.7. Remaining parameters do not change. Under this cali-
bration, we find that the optimal tax policy is slightly regressive with τ = −0.09, which
is close to a flat tax system. The associated welfare gain from switching to the optimal tax
code is equivalent to a 2.69% rise in consumption.
When the model is extended to allow for life-cycle income risk, two competing ef-
fects on optimal progressivity arise. On the one hand, agents find it easier to self-insure
against income shocks that are now less persistent. Consequently, there is less motivation
for insurance through progressive taxes. On the other hand, with lower persistence, the
precautionary savings motive weakens. This mutes the savings response to regressive
income taxes, and limits the response of the capital stock and, thereby, aggregate con-
sumption. In our extended calibration, average consumption increases by 15%, and the
coefficient of variation for consumption increases from 0.22 to 0.26. Both are much smaller
compared to the benchmark economy, where average consumption goes up by 30%, and
the inequality increases to 0.32.
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Table 1: Intergenerational Wage Mobility in the U.S.
Quartile 1 2 3 4
1 0.34 0.33 0.17 0.16
2 0.18 0.31 0.34 0.17
3 0.12 0.29 0.31 0.28
4 0.07 0.16 0.24 0.53
wage rate ($/hr) 9.7 14.9 20.2 33.0
Note.– Transition matrix between average lifetime (ages 24 to 60) wages of father-son pairs, controlling for
age and year effects. Data comes from the PSID (1968 - 2009).
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Table 2: Calibration of the Model to the U.S. Economy
Parameter Value Target Moment
T = 25 1/3 of life-time
σ = 2.00 relative risk aversion 2.00
β1/T = 0.965 annual interest rate 4.3%
θ = 0.305 average annual labor hours 0.44
e = 0.825 coef. of variation of hours 0.29
α = 0.36 capital share of income 0.36
δ = 0.88 annual depreciation rate 0.08
γ = 0.25 authors’ estimates of G/Y
τ = 0.17 authors’ estimates
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Table 3: Intergenerational Transition of Wealth
1 2 3 4 5
1 0.57 0.26 0.17 0.00 0.00
2 0.43 0.33 0.11 0.13 0.00
3 0.07 0.28 0.34 0.31 0.00
4 0.00 0.04 0.38 0.26 0.33
5 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.31 0.67
(a) Model
1 2 3 4 5
1 0.36 0.26 0.16 0.15 0.11
2 0.29 0.24 0.21 0.13 0.16
3 0.16 0.24 0.25 0.20 0.14
4 0.12 0.15 0.24 0.26 0.24
5 0.07 0.12 0.15 0.26 0.36
(b) PSID
Note.– Transition probabilities by quintiles of the wealth distribution. The PSID estimates are taken from
Table 2 of Charles and Hurst (2003).
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Table 4: Average Tax Rates by Income
Income Percentiles
Tax Policy <0.10 0.10–0.25 0.25–0.50 0.50–0.75 0.75–0.90 0.90–0.99 >0.99
Average Tax Rates (%)
Benchmark (U.S.) 16 18 22 26 29 29 30
Flat Tax 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
Lump-sum 42 35 30 24 18 18 17
Optimal 42 37 32 26 16 16 15
Total Tax Share (%)
Benchmark (U.S.) 1.5 7 21 28 25 16 2.1
Flat Tax 3.0 11 22 22 27 16 1.7
Lump-sum 7.3 18 24 24 15 11 1.1
Optimal 6.1 18 26 25 15 9.3 0.9
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Table 5: Optimal Tax System: Steady-State Comparison
Benchmark (U.S.) Flat Tax Lump Sum Optimal
Progressivity (τ) 0.17 0.00 – −0.38
Output 14.1 16.1 19.7 20.3
Interest Rate (%) 4.27 3.68 2.88 2.74
Wage Rate 0.21 0.22 0.25 0.26
Wealth/Capital 1.87 2.47 3.72 3.98
Hours Worked 0.44 0.46 0.51 0.52
Labor Input 44.0 46.2 50.4 50.8
Pre-tax Income 12.5 14.0 16.5 16.8
Consumption 9.4 10.5 12.3 12.6
Welfare -0.255 -0.245 -0.239 -0.238
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Table 6: Progressivity of Tax Policy and Inequality
Benchmark (U.S.) Flat Tax Lump Sum Optimal
Pre-tax Income 0.19 0.19 0.16 0.18
Disposable Income 0.16 0.19 0.22 0.25
Wealth 0.51 0.54 0.55 0.59
Consumption 0.13 0.15 0.16 0.18
Leisure 0.16 0.18 0.19 0.20
Welfare 0.14 0.16 0.19 0.20
Notes.– Table shows the Gini coefficient of inequality.
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Table 7: Wage mobility and Income Risk
1 2 3 4
1 0.75 0.17 0.05 0.04
2 0.27 0.43 0.21 0.08
3 0.10 0.22 0.41 0.25
4 0.04 0.05 0.14 0.80
(a) Life-Cycle
1 2 3 4
1 0.33 0.23 0.18 0.26
2 0.29 0.22 0.19 0.30
3 0.25 0.21 0.20 0.34
4 0.21 0.19 0.20 0.40
(b) Life-Cycle and Intergenerational
Note.– Transition matrices for wages over the life-cycle (a) and in combination with intergenerational trans-
missions (b).
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Figure 1: The progressivity of the U.S. tax system – Disposable household income as a function
of pre-tax income. Circles denote the average income net of taxes by quantiles of gross income. The solid
line is the fitted regression line. Data combines March supplements to CPS (1979 - 2009) with the NBER tax
simulator.
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Figure 2: Welfare by Wealth and Productivity
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Figure 3: Transition to Regressive Taxation
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Figure 4: Optimal Tax Policy along the Transition
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